Martin Herfurt

The security of Tesla’s cars has been a hot topic in recent months. In addition to being one of the safest cars on the road, it is also well-protected from hacks and attacks. But how does Tesla make sure their vehicles are safe and secure?

Note: This is related to Project TEMPA. Please follow this link for an overview! The Tesla Crypto Counter Confusion attack works by impersonating a vehicle with a tool like temparary. Once the app on the owner’s phone starts communicating to the emulated BLE interface of the impersonated car, the temparary tool will request an authorization from the phone.

Note: This is related to Project TEMPA. Please follow this link for an overview! The Tesla Authorization Replay attack is using a tool like temparary in order to extract VCSEC AuthorizationResponses from a whitelisted smartphone app. For AuthorizationRequests - that are mainly used for passive entry functions - the vehicle communicates a challenge token, that the smartphone app has to answer with an AuthorizationResponse which is embedded in a VCSEC SignedMessage object that has a SIGNATURE_TYPE_AES_GCM_TOKEN SignatureType.

Note: This is related to Project TEMPA. Please follow this link for an overview! The Tesla Key Drop attack works by impersonating a vehicle with a tool like temparary. Once the app on the owner’s phone starts communicating to the emulated BLE interface of the impersonated car, the temparary tool will request an authorization from the phone.

temparary.py is a pybleno-based python script, that acts as a VCSEC peripheral. Currently, the tool is very experimental and implements rudimentary interactions, only! https://github.com/trifinite/temparary This tool has been released in the context of Project TEMPA Disclaimer While it’s very TEMPting to use this tool in order to impersonate random cars, we advise you to only use this tool on vehicles and smartphones you own or have permission to use.

Note: This is related to Project TEMPA. Please follow this link for an overview! After unlocking the vehicle via NFC, Tesla allows potential attackers to store a key on the vehicle for a period of approx. 130s. No warning or similar will be displayed on the vehicle screen during this process.

VINTAG is an API client for trifinite's Tesla VIN Identifier API on rapidAPI

This archive can be found on github and contains all VCSEC protocol buffers definitions (aka proto-files). Additionally, there are two shell scripts that showcase the usage of the protoc tool, which is a pre-requisite for working with these files. https://github.com/trifinite/vcsec-archive

Note: This is related to Project TEMPA. Please follow this link for an overview! Besides the ability to relay the 2.4GHz radio signal between the PhoneKey and the Tesla vehicle, it is also possible to relay information on protocol level by using standard software like gattacker.

tempara.py is a Bleak-based python script, that acts as a VCSEC client. Currently, the tool is very experimental and implements rudimentary commands, only! https://github.com/trifinite/tempara This tool has been released in the context of Project TEMPA Disclaimer While it’s very TEMPting to use this tool to connect to random cars, we advise you to only use this tool on vehicles you own or have permission to use.

Tesla cars with enabled 'Phone Key' feature transmit a unique identifier, that can be detected using Bluetooth® Wireless Technology. By installing this app, your device becomes aware of Tesla vehicles in its proximity. The gathered data is shared in order to generate a global crowd-sourced heatmap of detectable Tesla cars.

The Smart Lock Feature allows Android users (Android version 5.0 and later) to automatically unlock their smartphone whenever a trusted device, Wi-Fi network or geo location is in close proximity. Trusted devices could either be NFC tags or Bluetooth devices. Looking at Bluetooth devices, it turned out that the Smart Lock implementation had at least one security issue that got resolved.

BlueChop is an attack that the disrupts any established bluetooth piconet by means of a device that is not participating the piconet. A precondition for this attack is that the master of the piconet supports multiple connections (a feature that is necessary for building up scatternets).

Blooover II is the successor of the very popular application Blooover. After 150000 downloads of Blooover within the year 2005 (since the initial release in at 21c3 in December 2004), a new version of this mobile phone auditing toool is on its ready.

The carwhisperer project intends to sensibilise manufacturers of carkits and other Bluetooth appliances without display and keyboard for the possible security threat evolving from the use of standard passkeys. A Bluetooth passkey is used within the pairing process that takes place, when two Bluetooth enabled devices connect for the first time.

BlueDumping is the act of causing a Bluetooth device to ‘dump’ it’s stored link key, thereby creating an opportunity for key-exchange sniffing to take place. The attacks on link keys and PINs were first publicised by Ollie Whitehouse, at CanSecWest, in which he describes a method by which the PIN and link-keys can be obtained if a pairing event can be witnessed with a Bluetooth sniffer.

BlueSnarf++ is an attack that is very similar to the famous BlueSnarf attack. The main difference is that BlueSnarf++ is an attack where the attacker has full read/write access to the device’s filesystem. The manufacturers of the devices that are known to be vulnerable have been informed about this issue.

The BlueBump attack is the Bluetooth equivalent to a very cool physical security thread called key bumping. When used correctly, an appropriate bump key can be used to open any lock in seconds. Since the BlueBump attack is also about keys (link keys in this case) we named this attack after this amazing technique.

BlueSmack is a Bluetooth attack that knocks out some Bluetooth-enabled devices immediately. This Denial of Service attack can be conducted using standard tools that ship with the official Linux Bluez utils package. Introduction The ‘Ping of Death’ is basically a network ping packet that used to knock out early versions of Microsoft Windows 95.

The information on this page is intended to help people that want to modify their bluetooth equipment in order to connect an external (directional) antenna to their Bluetooth dongle. This Bluetooth tuning makes it possible to concentrate the emission of bluetooth signals to one direction instead of any direction.

Blueprinting is a method to remotely find out details about bluetooth-enabled devices. Blueprinting can be used for generating statistics about manufacturers and models and to find out whether there are devices in range that have issues with Bluetooth security. (read more about bluetooth security issues here)

Since Adam Laurie’s BlueSnarf experiment and the subsequent BlueBug experiment it is proven that some Bluetooth-enabled phones have security issues. Until now, attackers need laptops for the snarfing of other people’s information. Unless attackers do a long-distance-snarf, people would see that there is somebody with a laptop trying to do strange things.

The long-distance-snarf is an experiment that took place in the early morning of 4th August 2004 at the [Santa Monica Pier](https://web.archive.org/web/2005/http://www.westland.net/piercam/) in California.

BlueBug is the name of a bluetooth security loophole on some bluetooth-enabled cell phones. Exploiting this loophole allows the unauthorized downloading phone books and call lists, the sending and reading of SMS messages from the attacked phone and many more things.